On June 25, 2026, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Wright v. Goldstein, 2026 COA 54, addressing whether a party waives its right to challenge arbitrability, on the ground that no agreement to arbitrate exists, by participating in an arbitration proceeding before objecting. The division held that, under the Colorado Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (“CRUAA”), § 13-22-223(1)(e), C.R.S. 2025, a party preserves the objection so long as it is raised to the arbitrator “not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing.” In so holding, the division expressly declined to follow a prior division’s contrary conclusion in Harper Hofer & Associates, LLC v. Northwest Direct Marketing, Inc., 2014 COA 153, creating a split among divisions of the court.
Background
The CRUAA, §§ 13-22-201 to -230, C.R.S. 2025, provides a uniform framework for arbitration and strictly limits a reviewing court’s role, permitting a court to decline to confirm an award only for the reasons enumerated in § 13-22-223(1). The absence of an agreement to arbitrate is one such ground, but it is waivable. Under § 13-22-223(1)(e), a party waives the objection if it participates in the arbitration without raising it “not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing.”
In 2012, James Wright and Daniel Goldstein, through their companies Damages Inc. and Altru-Media (a subsidiary of Page 1 Solutions), respectively, formed And Justice For All, LLC (“AJFA”), a legal-advertising website venture, with each company holding a fifty percent interest. They executed an operating agreement and a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”). The MOU contained a broad arbitration clause requiring disputes to be submitted to the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) for binding arbitration.
AJFA was never profitable. In 2019, Goldstein moved to sell Page 1 Solutions’ assets. Believing this breached the operating agreement, the Wright plaintiffs sued the Goldstein defendants, asserting breach of contract and several tort claims. The Goldstein defendants moved to compel arbitration under the MOU. Over the Wright plaintiffs’ objection, the district court compelled arbitration.
During a pre-hearing conference almost a year into the arbitration proceeding, and just four days before the scheduled merits hearing, Wright objected that he signed the MOU only as a corporate representative of Damages Inc. and was therefore not personally bound by the arbitration clause. Accordingly, Wright argued the claims he was asserting in his individual capacity were not required to be arbitrated. The arbitrator, relying on Harper Hofer, found the objection waived because Wright had not also sought a judicial stay under § 13-22-207(2).
The arbitrator found the Goldstein defendants not liable on any claim and awarded them their attorneys’ fees. The Wright plaintiffs moved to vacate the award, but the district court instead confirmed it, agreeing with the arbitrator that Wright waived his arbitrability objection by failing to raise it earlier in a motion to stay the arbitration. The Wright plaintiffs appealed.
The Division’s Analysis
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the CRUAA’s plain language requires only that a party raise an objection to arbitral jurisdiction to the arbitrator no later than the beginning of the hearing, and it does not additionally require the objecting party to seek a judicial stay. The court found persuasive out-of-state authority construing similar statutory language and disagreed with Harper Hofer for failing to grapple with the statute’s plain text. The division emphasized that the General Assembly may modify ordinary waiver principles, and in fact did so here by setting a relatively late objection deadline that parties may not waive or vary under § 13-22-204(3)(a). The court remanded for the district court to determine arbitrability of the claims between Wright in his individual capacity and the Goldstein defendants.
On a separate issue, the court affirmed that Goldstein and Page 1 Solutions, though nonsignatories to the MOU, assumed the obligation to arbitrate through their conduct, including by actively and voluntarily participating in the proceeding, listing themselves as claimants, and declining to seek resolution of claims outside arbitration.
Significance
The decision creates a split among divisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals on the question of when a party must raise an objection to arbitrability to avoid waiving it under the CRUAA. Under Wright v. Goldstein, a party contesting the existence of an arbitration agreement need only object to the arbitrator before the hearing begins to preserve the issue for a later motion to vacate and is not required to seek a judicial stay. Harper Hofer, however, indicates a motion to stay is required under § 13-22-207(2) to preserve an objection to arbitrability.
The opinion was authored by Judge Sullivan, with Judges Pawar and Meirink concurring.
For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of the Davis Graham Appellate Group.