On May 29, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado, limiting the scope of environmental review required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In an 8-0 decision, from which Justice Gorsuch recused himself, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision vacating the Surface Transportation Board’s (STB) approval of an 88-mile railway in northeastern Utah. A majority of the Court held that the STB was not required to analyze the environmental effects of upstream oil development or downstream refining activity, because those projects were separate in both time and regulatory jurisdiction from the proposed railway. Three concurring justices, however, would have vacated the STB’s approval on entirely different grounds.
The decision narrows the range of indirect impacts that agencies must consider in environmental impact statements (EISs) and environmental assessments (EAs). The Court emphasized the role of agency discretion in determining the scope of NEPA review and warned against judicial interference that transforms NEPA into a tool for delaying or blocking infrastructure or other project development. Below are four key takeaways:
NEPA Does Not Require Agencies to Analyze Environmental Effects of Separate Projects
The majority held that the STB was not required to assess the environmental consequences of oil drilling in the Uintah Basin or refining activity along the coasts of Texas and Louisiana, even if those activities might increase as a result of the railway’s construction. The majority explained that NEPA focuses on the environmental effects of the proposed action, meaning the project under the agency’s jurisdiction. Agencies need not analyze the effects of “separate projects,” particularly when those projects fall under the jurisdiction of different regulatory bodies. The majority reasoned that, even though the effects of a separate project may be a “factually foreseeable” consequence of an agency action, NEPA does not obligate agencies to analyze these effects because “the causal chain is too attenuated.”
Underpinning this decision is the majority’s concern that courts are interfering with agency decision-making. The majority opined that “[a] relatively modest infrastructure project should not be turned into a scapegoat for everything that ensues from upstream oil drilling to downstream refining emissions.” The majority then chided courts to “strive, where possible, for clarity and predictability.” And, the majority took a swipe at litigants using NEPA to thwart agency approvals, stating that “[t]he political process, and not NEPA, provides the appropriate forum in which to air policy disagreements.”
Importantly, the majority acknowledged a potential and limited exception for projects that are closely connected in both time and location. In such cases, an agency may be required to treat the projects as a single action for purposes of NEPA review. Even in those circumstances, however, the agency’s judgment about whether two projects are sufficiently interrelated remains subject to deference. The majority warned that the existence of some potential relationship between projects is not enough to collapse them into a single NEPA analysis unless they are functionally and temporally linked.
Deference is Dead – Long Live Deference
Although the Court last year eliminated Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), the majority in Seven County described deference as the “central principle of judicial review in NEPA cases” and held that agency NEPA decisions are entitled to “substantial deference.” The majority reasoned that NEPA’s procedural nature warrants such deference. Furthermore, the majority criticized courts that have second-guessed agency judgments about the content and structure of an EIS and emphasized that NEPA does not require courts to “micromanage” agency decisions or demand exhaustive discussion of every conceivable environmental effect. Instead, courts must “disaggregate” their role from an agency’s role and need only review whether the agency “reasonably considered” the environmental consequences of the specific project under review.
The Concurrence Rejects the Majority’s Broader Reasoning
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, concurred in the judgment but declined to adopt the majority’s sweeping holding that eliminated agencies’ obligation to analyze the impacts of separate projects and the majority’s criticism of judicial overreach. The concurrence focused instead on a narrower rationale: That the STB lacked legal authority to deny the railway project based on potential drilling or refining activity, and therefore was not required to analyze those effects under NEPA. The concurring justices expressed concern with the majority’s emphasis on policy and its broader reading of NEPA limitations. While the outcome appears unanimous, the concurring opinion’s analysis sharply diverged from the majority’s holding.
The Decision is a “Course Correction” at a Time When NEPA Implementation is Already in Flux
The majority described its decision as a “course correction” necessary “to bring judicial under NEPA back in line with the statutory text and common sense.” But the decision is also significant because it comes at a crossroads for NEPA implementation. At President Trump’s direction, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has rescinded its existing NEPA regulations. Further, the President has directed federal agencies to revise their NEPA procedures to expedite permitting approvals. And, voices on the political right and left increasingly cite NEPA as an obstacle to the federal government’s ability to move nimbly to approve projects and infrastructure. As agencies move forward with revising their NEPA procedures to expedite permitting, Seven County will certainly influence these procedures.
The Seven County decision will particularly impact NEPA analyses for fossil fuel development and infrastructure. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) faced a series of judicial decisions, finding it failed to adequately analyze the “downstream” impacts of oil and gas leasing and development. Similarly, courts have found flaws with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) analysis of greenhouse emissions associated with natural gas pipelines. The Seven County holding eliminating the obligation to analyze the impacts of separate projects will streamline agencies’ analysis prepared in response to these judicial decisions and analysis prepared for new oil and gas leasing, development, and infrastructure. Moreover, the majority’s language criticizing courts that “micromanage” the NEPA process should provide federal agencies with the confidence to complete NEPA analyses timely and allow projects to move forward.
Notably, although the Seven County holding is significant, it only relates to one element of NEPA analysis—secondary effects from proposed projects. Seven County does not directly address other issues that arise in NEPA litigation, such as the adequacy of alternatives, public participation, and what impacts are “significant”—except to reinforce that agencies are entitled to deference on these issues.
In sum, the Court’s decision provides important clarification on the limits of NEPA’s scope. By affirming that agencies are not required to evaluate environmental effects arising from actions outside their regulatory authority, and by reinforcing that NEPA’s procedural nature, the decision is likely to reduce litigation risk for environmental reviews that are carefully framed and thoughtfully documented.