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  • Colorado to Launch CAERS Platform for Annual Air Emission Reporting in January 2027

    In January 2027, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment’s (CDPHE) Air Pollution Control Division (the Division) will open the Combined Air Emissions Reporting System (CAERS) for annual reporting of certain criteria pollutants, ozone precursors, and toxic air contaminants (TAC) emissions under Colorado Air Quality Control Commission (AQCC) Regulation No. 3, Part A, Section IX.  The first reports, covering calendar year 2026 emissions, are due June 30, 2027, and the Division has requested that expected reporters complete several registration steps by December 1 and December 15, 2026. A list of the expected CAERS reporters is available here: Expected Reporter List. Facilities should review the expected reporter list and conduct their own applicability analysis to confirm whether they must report using CAERS before the December registration dates.  Facilities with questions about their CAERS reporting obligations should review the Division’s CAERS Webpage or contact a member of the Davis Graham Environmental Group.

    Background

    The new reporting rules stem from the Public Protections from Toxic Air Contaminants Act (HB22-1244). To implement that statute, the AQCC adopted a new annual emissions reporting regulation in Regulation 3, Part A, Section IX, requiring certain facilities to submit annual emissions reports by June 30th each year “in a Division-approved format.” The AQCC also created an additional list of 118 TACs in Regulation 3, Part A, Appendix C with associated reporting thresholds that fall below the standard Air Pollutant Emission Notice (APEN) reporting threshold.

    CAERS is a centralized EPA application that is already used by ten other air agencies across the country.  Beginning in January 2027, CAERS will serve as the “Division-approved” format for Section IX annual emissions reports. The Division hopes that CAERS will streamline reporting by consolidating criteria pollutant and TAC data in a single report and provide facilities with a head start on their Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) reporting under 40 C.F.R. Part 372.

    Who Must Report in CAERS

    Facilities in any of the following five categories must report annual criteria pollutant and TAC emissions through CAERS:

    • Title V major sources. Sources that have, or are required to obtain, a Title V operating permit, including sources that applied or should have applied for a Title V permit because their actual or potential emissions exceed major source thresholds.
    • Synthetic minor sources. Sources with permits containing enforceable conditions on emissions or operations that keep them below major source thresholds.
    • Minor sources with specific metal processes. Permitted, APEN-only, or APEN-exempt minor sources in NAICS codes 325, 331, 332, 333, 335, or 811 that conduct electroplating, plating, polishing, anodizing, coloring, thermal spraying, welding, plasma cutting, metal heat treating, or other metal fabrication (excluding fuel combustion), and whose facility-wide emissions reach at least 0.088 pounds per year of cadmium, 0.16 pounds per year of nickel, or 0.013 pounds per year of hexavalent chromium.
    • Minor sources emitting ethylene oxide. Sources with facility-wide ethylene oxide emissions of at least 0.032 pounds per year.
    • EPA TRI reporters. Sources that report to EPA’s TRI stack or fugitive air releases of any Appendix C TAC above the Appendix C reporting thresholds.

    A facility that falls within one of these categories must report all non-exempt equipment and activities, along with unit specifications, release points, and control devices using CAERS. Facilities must also report every Appendix C TAC emitted at or above the applicable threshold, and criteria pollutants and precursors (CO, NOx, VOC, SO2, PM2.5, and PM10) at or above APEN thresholds, or at lower levels if VOC or PM emissions are used to estimate any TAC. Some APEN-exempt equipment remains subject to Section IX reporting, so sources should review the exemption list on the Division’s CAERS Webpage to confirm whether their APEN-exempt equipment must be included in their CAERS reports.  

    Notably, a report is required even if the facility did not operate in 2026 or its emissions fell below all reporting thresholds; in those cases, the facility marks itself as temporarily or permanently shut down in CAERS and, for a permanent shutdown, completes the APEN cancellation process.

    The Division has indicated that a facility’s CAERS account may be pre-populated with equipment and other data based on the facility’s prior reporting to the Division, but the pre-populated data must be carefully reviewed for errors or mislabeling.  Going forward, the equipment and data will remain in the facility’s CAERS account, which should decrease reporting time in subsequent reporting years.

    Upstream and Midstream Oil and Gas Operations Continue to Report Through ONGAEIR

    CAERS will not be used for oil and gas equipment and activities in the upstream and midstream oil and gas segments.  Equipment and activities subject to AQCC Regulation No. 7, Part B, Section V, which covers oil and gas operations and equipment at or upstream of a natural gas processing plant and Class II disposal well facilities, will continue to report annual emissions through the Oil and Natural Gas Annual Emission Inventory Reporting (ONGAEIR) platform.

    Key Deadlines

    The Division has published the following timeline and key deadlines for the first reporting year:

    • December 1, 2026 (recommended). Submit the Colorado CAERS User Registration Form to pre-register preparers and the certifier. If a facility meets the applicability criteria but does not appear on the Division’s expected reporters list, submit a Facility Creation Request Form, one per facility, so the facility can be loaded into CAERS by mid-January.
    • December 15, 2026 (recommended). Register in, or add the CAERS module to, EPA’s Central Data Exchange (CDX), and request preparer access to the facility. Certifier-only users should wait to complete this step.  The Division is working through some issues with certifier-only users and will advise when to request the certifier role.
    • Mid-January 2027. CAERS opens for 2026 reporting, with data pre-populated from Division records.
    • June 1, 2027 (recommended). Complete the 2026 report and resolve quality assurance checks.
    • June 30, 2027 (required). The certifier registered in CAERS must certify and submit the 2026 report to the Division.

    Minor sources with specific metal processes or ethylene oxide emissions may qualify for a one-year extension for reporting using CAERS, with first reports due in 2028 rather than 2027. To qualify, the facility must not have reported greenhouse gas or APEN emissions to the Division, or reported to EPA’s TRI, since January 1, 2020.

    Conclusion

    Facilities should confirm whether they fall within a CAERS reporting category, check the expected reporters list, complete registration before the December deadlines, and begin compiling 2026 emissions data. Below is a list of helpful links provided by the Division:

    • Division’s CAERS Webpage
    • Expected Reporter List
    • Facility Creation Request Form
    • CAERS User Registration Form

    Furthermore, the Division hosted an “Introduction to CAERS” training session on November 5, 2026, and is planning to host a “Welcome to CAERS” training session on January 13, 2027. A recording of the November training session with presentation slides is available on the Division’s CAERS Webpage, as is the registration link for the upcoming January 2027 training session.


    For questions about this legal alert or CAERS reporting, please contact a member of the Davis Graham Environmental & Public Lands Group.

    Caroline Schorsch

    November 19, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • Colorado Court of Appeals Holds that the Rule 12(b)(5) Standard Applies when the Court Record Includes Affidavits Filed with a Separate Anti-SLAPP Motion

    Introduction 

    On October 1, 2026, a unanimous division of the Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Summers v. Summers, 2026 COA 73, holding that the well-established C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) legal standard applies even when the court record includes affidavits filed with a separate anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss pursuant to section 13‑20‑1101, C.R.S. (2026). As a result, the division concluded that it could not examine the anti-SLAPP affidavits when reviewing the defendant’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion for failure to state a claim because the affidavits constituted matters outside the pleadings. 

    Applying this rule, the division affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. 

    Background 

    This case stems from a dispute between a father, Craig Summers, and his adult son, Colin Summers. In 2024, Colin sent two text messages to his father and adult sister. One text threatened Craig with physical abuse; the other accused him of raping Colin’s mother several years earlier. 

    The parties submitted substantively identical screenshots of the relevant text messages as part of the anti-SLAPP filings. 

    Craig sued for defamation based on the second text and for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on both texts. Colin filed two motions to dismiss: one under section 13‑20‑1101 (Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute) and another under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss but granted the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion. 

    The district court explained that it dismissed the defamation claim because the complaint failed to allege facts that negated the conditional privilege that attaches to communications between non-spousal family members. See CJI‑Civ. 22:18, Notes on Use 3 (2026). 

    The district court also dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based solely on its dismissal of the defamation claim. It reasoned that a statement that cannot support a defamation claim cannot support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim either. 

    Craig appealed the district court’s ruling as to the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion. 

    The Division’s Analysis 

    The division first addressed which legal standard applied: the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) standard, under which a court generally may not consider matters outside the pleadings, or the anti‑SLAPP standard under section 13‑20‑1101, where a court may consider such matters. The division concluded that the well-established C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) standard governs because the anti-SLAPP motion was not at issue on appeal. As a result, the division could not consider the anti-SLAPP affidavits, even though they were part of the court record. 

    After addressing the correct legal standard, the division evaluated the lower court’s dismissal of the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.  

    The defamation claim. The division concluded that the district court erred because it dismissed the claim on the ground that the complaint did not allege facts that negated the affirmative defense (i.e., the conditional privilege that attaches to communications between non-spousal family members). The division clarified that a court may dismiss a claim based on an affirmative defense when the complaint affirmatively establishes that the defense bars the claim. See Bristol Bay Prods., LLC v. Lampack, 2013 CO 60, ¶ 44 (discussing the limited circumstances under which a court may dismiss a claim based on an affirmative defense raised in a motion to dismiss). As the division noted, “a [complainant] need not plead the inapplicability of an affirmative defense to survive a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.” 

    The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The division affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, but on different grounds from the district court. As a threshold issue, the division explained that, because the complaint referenced the text messages, which were central to the claims, the messages were not matters outside the pleadings. See Yadon v. Lowry, 126 P.3d 332, 336 (Colo. App. 2005). 

    Next, the division evaluated whether the text message alleging physical abuse constituted outrageous conduct. See Coors Brewing Co. v. Floyd, 978 P.2d 663, 666 (Colo. 1999) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (A.L.I. 1965)). After considering the context in which the text was sent, including Colin’s possible retraction of the “threat” forty-eight hours later, the division concluded that the message did not rise to the level of outrageous conduct. 

    The division then examined whether the text message alleging rape was outrageous. As with the threatening text, the division concluded that it was not, reasoning that, although possibly painful and offensive, the text did not go “beyond all possible bounds of decency so as to be utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 

    The division thus reversed the dismissal of the defamation claim and affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 

    Implications 

    Summers v. Summers offers two important takeaways. 

    First, the decision demonstrates the far-reaching application of the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) legal standard. In ruling on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion, a court must not consider matters outside the pleadings, even when the record contains affidavits filed in support of an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss under section 13‑20‑1101. 

    Second, the decision underscores the importance of identifying the correct legal standard for reviewing a claim’s dismissal, particularly when two competing standards could apply. A party that relies on the wrong standard could misjudge the viability of its claim under a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion. 

    Judge Taubman authored the opinion, with Judges Sullivan and Meirink concurring. 

    For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of the Davis Graham Appellate Group.

    Caroline Schorsch

    October 29, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • Colorado Court of Appeals Upholds Air Quality Control Commission’s Enhanced Monitoring Rule for Disproportionately Impacted Communities 

    On October 15, 2026, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in GreenLatinos v. Colorado Air Quality Control Commission, 2026 COA 74, affirming a district court judgment upholding 2023 revisions to Colorado Air Quality Control Commission (AQCC) Regulation No. 3, a rule that imposes enhanced air pollution monitoring requirements on new and modified stationary sources in disproportionately impacted communities. In a case of first impression, the court concluded that the AQCC acted reasonably and within its statutory authority under the Colorado Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, the Environmental Justice Act (EJA) codified within it, and the state’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 

    Background 

    In 2021, the Colorado General Assembly enacted the EJA to “rapidly reduce pollution in disproportionately impacted communities.” Ch. 411, sec. 2(2)(b)(I), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2724. Among other things, the EJA directed the AQCC to impose “enhanced modeling and monitoring requirements for new and modified sources of affected pollutants” in those communities. § 25-7-114.4(5)(b)(II)(A), C.R.S. (2026). Disproportionately impacted communities are census blocks meeting at least one of several statutory criteria tied to income, housing costs, race, linguistic isolation, tribal lands, and cumulative environmental burdens. § 24-4-109(2)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2026). 

    The AQCC revised Regulation 3 in 2023 to subdivide disproportionately impacted communities using EnviroScreen, a tool developed by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment and Colorado State University that weighs thirty-five health, social, and environmental indicators. Sources in “cumulatively impacted” communities, which score above the eightieth percentile, must implement onsite, source-specific monitoring. Sources in “socioeconomically vulnerable” communities instead pay a one-time community monitoring fee, based on emission rates, source category, and location, that funds a community monitoring program administered by the Air Pollution Control Division (the Division). 

    Plaintiffs GreenLatinos, 350 Colorado, and Earthworks challenged the rule’s monitoring provisions in the City and County of Denver District Court, which upheld the rule. The plaintiffs then appealed. 

    The Division’s Analysis 

    Under the APA, the central question was whether the AQCC acted reasonably. The court addressed and rejected each of the plaintiffs’ arguments in turn. 

    The court first considered whether the rule satisfies the EJA’s “enhanced monitoring” mandate. The plaintiffs argued that the EJA required all sources in disproportionately impacted communities to conduct source-specific monitoring. Because the EJA does not define “enhanced,” the court gave the term its ordinary meaning (to “heighten, increase” or “raise”) and concluded that the rule satisfies the statute by raising permit requirements (i.e., requiring source‑specific monitoring plans or community monitoring fees) for certain sources located within disproportionately impacted communities beyond those previously in place. It declined to infer a narrower meaning from the EJA’s broader policy goals, reasoning that the General Assembly would have said “source-specific monitoring” had it intended that result and that leaving the term undefined suggests a grant of discretion to the AQCC. 

    The court next rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the community monitoring fee was unreasonable because it did not require anyone to operate community monitors and lacked record support. The rule expressly directs the Division to use collected fees to administer community monitoring, and speculation that the Division will not do so does not make the rule unreasonable. The record reflected the AQCC’s plan to install an average of five monitors per year in disproportionately impacted communities, and a direction to reevaluate fee amounts every three years. Because the fee structure rests primarily on policy considerations, the AQCC was not required to supply calculations supporting each tiered amount, so long as its reasoning was defensible. 

    The court then turned to the AQCC’s use of EnviroScreen to divide disproportionately impacted communities into “cumulatively impacted” and “socioeconomically vulnerable” communities. The plaintiffs argued that the AQCC offered no rationale for relying on a tool that considers more than air pollution. The court acknowledged that EnviroScreen scores reflect a range of environmental and public health factors, but it held that tailoring monitoring requirements to the overall burdens each community faces is consistent with the EJA, which directs the AQCC to impose enhanced monitoring requirements. 

    The court likewise upheld the eightieth percentile threshold. The plaintiffs contended that the threshold was modeled on an unrelated federal standard and excluded communities with high air pollution burdens from source-specific monitoring. The court agreed that the rule excludes some such communities, but it found the AQCC’s rationale discernible from the Statement of Basis and Purpose, which cited expert feedback, community input through the Environmental Justice Action Task Force, federal practices relevant to National Ambient Air Quality Standards, and the statutory presumption in section 24-4-109(5)(a)(I) that census block groups scoring above the eightieth percentile are disproportionately impacted. 

    Finally, the court held that the AQCC was not required to identify hazardous air pollutants beyond the four named in the statute. The EJA defines affected pollutants to include hazardous air pollutants “as identified by the commission, including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene.” § 25-7-114.4(5)(d)(I)(C). Construing that as permissive language, the court declined to read in a duty to list more hazardous air pollutants, noting that the legislature would have used mandatory language such as “shall” had it intended to impose a mandatory duty on the AQCC to list hazardous air pollutants beyond those provided in the EJA. Although the plaintiffs showed during rulemaking that twelve additional pollutants identified by EnviroScreen have health impacts, the AQCC was not obligated to adopt that alternative policy proposal. 

    Significance 

    The decision is the first appellate interpretation of the EJA’s enhanced monitoring mandate, and it confirms that the AQCC has meaningful discretion in implementing it. For permit applicants with new or modified sources in disproportionately impacted communities, the ruling leaves the current two-tier structure in place: source-specific monitoring plans in “cumulatively impacted” communities and one-time fees in “socioeconomically vulnerable” communities. 

    At the same time, the opinion’s reasoning and the rule’s structure itself leave room for future change. The AQCC must revisit its list of affected pollutants every three years, and the rule contemplates periodic reevaluation of the fee schedule, so the scope of monitoring obligations and fee amounts may shift through subsequent rulemakings. 

    The decision was authored by Judge Fox with Judges Johnson and Yun concurring. 

    GreenLatinos, 350 Colorado, and Earthworks collectively filed a petition for rehearing on Oct. 29. The court denied that petition on Nov. 12.
     
    For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of the Davis Graham Appellate Group. 

    Caroline Schorsch

    October 29, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • Colorado Supreme Court Holds Post-Injury Online Ski Pass Waiver is Enforceable Release of Existing Claims

    On September 21, 2026, the Colorado Supreme Court issued a split decision in Litterer v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc., 2026 CO 65. The majority held that a snowboarder—while in active litigation against a resort and its employee for injuries he sustained in a past snowmobile collision—released his existing claims after executing a liability waiver as part of the online purchase of an Epic Pass for a subsequent season. The majority reasoned that because the waiver concerned a post-injury release, it was not an exculpatory agreement subject to Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC, 2024 CO 30, which governs pre-injury exculpatory agreements. Further, the court held that willful and wanton conduct is not an independent tort in Colorado. This affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

    Background

    In December 2020, John Litterer was injured while snowboarding at Breckenridge Ski Resort—which is owned by Vail Summit Resorts, Inc. (“VSRI”)—in a collision with a snowmobile operated by a VSRI employee. Litterer subsequently filed suit against VSRI and its employee, asserting several claims, including one for willful and wanton conduct, and seeking exemplary damages. While his lawsuit was in active litigation, Litterer purchased an Epic Pass for the 2022–23 ski season online. As part of the purchase, he electronically executed a “Release of Liability, Waiver of Claims, Assumption of Risks and Indemnity Agreement” (the “2022 online waiver”). The waiver stated in capitalized text that the signer would

    FURTHER RELEASE AND GIVE UP ANY AND ALL CLAIMS AND RIGHTS THAT I MAY NOW HAVE AGAINST ANY RELEASED PARTY,” including “ALL CLAIMS, INCLUDING THOSE OF WHICH I AM NOT AWARE, THOSE NOT MENTIONED IN THIS RELEASE AND THOSE RESULTING FROM ANYTHING WHICH HAS HAPPENED UP TO NOW.

    The definition of “Released Party” included VSRI and its employees.

    Respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Litterer released all claims against them when he executed the 2022 online waiver. The district court agreed, characterizing the waiver as a release rather than an exculpatory agreement and concluding that adequate consideration supported the waiver. The court of appeals affirmed, and Litterer petitioned for certiorari review.

    The Court’s Analysis

    The majority of the Court—Justice Berkenkotter, Chief Justice Marquez, Justice Boatright, and Justice Blanco—made the following three holdings.

    1. The 2022 Online Waiver Operated as a Release, Not an Exculpatory Agreement.

    The Court distinguished between a release—which is the relinquishment of a vested right or claim—and an exculpatory agreement, which attempts to insulate a party from liability for its own future negligence. Because Litterer executed the 2022 online waiver after his injury, after filing suit, and while litigation was ongoing, the Court concluded that it operated as a release of his existing claims, not as a forward-looking exculpatory agreement. The Court applied traditional rules of contract interpretation and found that Litterer demonstrated mutual assent through his conduct: Litterer electronically signed the waiver, purchased the pass, and used it to snowboard at Breckenridge. Litterer’s subjective, unexpressed intent not to release his claims was irrelevant when determining “the requisite meeting of the minds.”   

    The Court also rejected Litterer’s argument that the waiver was overly broad and unenforceable, declining to adopt the reasoning of Farina v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 66 F.3d 233 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that release clause for “any and all claims that an injury skier might bring” violated Oregon public policy). Farina involved a pre-injury waiver and did not address whether a post-injury waiver of claims was an unenforceable exculpatory agreement.

    2. Miller v. Crested Butte Does Not Apply.

    The Court held that Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC, 2024 CO 30, which prohibits ski resorts from using exculpatory agreements to bar negligence per se claims based on certain statutory duties, was inapplicable because Miller governs pre-injury exculpatory agreements, not post-injury releases.

    3. Willful and Wanton Conduct and Exemplary Damages Claims Were Properly Dismissed.

    The Court held that “willful and wanton conduct” is not an independent tort in Colorado, but rather a descriptive standard used in the context of assessing exemplary damages under § 13-21-102, C.R.S. Because all of Litterer’s underlying claims were validly released when he purchased the Epic pass and electronically signed the waiver, there was no independent civil action to which exemplary damages could attach. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims.

    The Dissent

    Justice Gabriel, joined by Justices Hood and Samour, dissented. The dissent found that the Release was predominantly an exculpatory agreement based on its actual language—which was largely forward-looking—regardless of when it was signed. Analyzing the fourth factor set forth in Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981), the dissent concluded that the Release failed to express the parties’ intent in clear and unambiguous language due to its excessive legal jargon, length, complexity, and the likelihood that a reasonable purchaser would not recognize the scope of the Epic Pass’s release provisions.

    The dissent further reasoned that the exculpatory provisions were void as against public policy because they facially purported to release claims for willful and wanton negligence and negligence per se in violation of Jones and Miller. The dissent would have held that the void exculpatory provisions could not be severed from the release provisions, rendering the entire Release unenforceable.


    For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of the Davis Graham Appellate Group.

    Caroline Schorsch

    October 29, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • PFAS Risks for Mining and Metals Companies

    Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)—often called “forever chemicals”—have dominated environmental law headlines in recent years. Most recently, the DC Circuit upheld EPA’s designation of two PFAS compounds (PFOA and PFOS) as hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Mining and metals companies face PFAS-related liability risks given the historical and ongoing uses of PFAS-containing materials in these industries—from firefighting foams to ore processing and metal finishing. These risks include legacy contamination that may give rise to CERCLA litigation and enforcement, as well as potential ongoing compliance obligations, including Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) reporting under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and discharge permitting under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Companies should consult with counsel to evaluate potential exposure from both ongoing operations and legacy activities.

    I. Background on PFAS and Evolving Regulations

    PFAS are a class of thousands of synthetic chemicals characterized by strong carbon-fluorine bonds, making them resistant to heat, water, and oil. Since their development in the 1940s and 1950s, PFAS have been used extensively in fire suppressant foams (AFFF), surfactants, and other industrial applications. The chemical properties that make PFAS useful also make them extraordinarily persistent in the environment—they do not break down under normal conditions and can migrate through soil into groundwater. Research has linked certain PFAS to adverse health effects, including reproductive issues and increased cancer risk, driving heightened regulatory scrutiny.

    The regulatory landscape for PFAS continues to evolve. Key regulations have been promulgated under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and EPCRA. Most significantly for the mining sector, in April 2024, EPA designated PFOA and PFOS as “hazardous substances” under CERCLA Section 102(a)—the first time EPA has exercised this rulemaking authority. The designation requires reporting of releases that meet or exceed one pound within a 24-hour period, authorizes EPA enforcement actions, and exposes potentially responsible parties to strict, joint and several liability.

    In a challenge by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other industry groups, the DC Circuit recently upheld EPA’s rule, affirming the agency’s authority to designate PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances under CERCLA (Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. EPA, 187 F.4th 636 (D.C. Cir. 2026)). The decision removes a key source of regulatory uncertainty and confirms that PFOA and PFOS contamination will remain subject to CERCLA’s federal enforcement and liability framework.

    II. PFAS Use in Mining and Metals

    PFAS litigation has proliferated in recent years, primarily targeting manufacturers and sites with known AFFF use. Mining and metals operations have received limited attention. However, PFAS liability risks nonetheless may arise due to AFFF usage at mine sites and industry-specific applications in ore processing and metal finishing. Key activities and sources may include:

    • AFFF firefighting foam: PFAS-containing aqueous film-forming foam has been used at mine sites to combat fires in remote locations and high-hazard settings. For example, at the Sugar Camp Mine in Illinois, AFFF deployment to combat an underground fire resulted in PFOS concentrations in nearby surface waters exceeding 50 times the federal drinking water standard, leading to enforcement and private litigation.
    • Leaching and flotation: PFAS-based surfactants have been used in copper and gold extraction operations to enhance wetting and improve metal recovery.
    • Mist suppression and metal finishing: PFAS have been used as mist suppressants in copper electrowinning and as wetting agents in chrome plating, electroplating, and anodizing operations.
    • Equipment and materials: Fluoropolymers are used in some equipment components, including pipes, cables, hoses, and conveyor belts. PFAS-based surfactants may also be present in drilling fluids, paints, coatings, and cleaners used in mining operations, although these products do not necessarily contain PFOA or PFOS.
    • Biosolids: Biosolids (treated sewage sludge) have been used to improve revegetation and reclamation at legacy mining sites but often contain PFAS. The Palmerton Zinc Pile Superfund site illustrates this risk—biosolids applied in the 1990s for revegetation are recognized as a likely source of PFAS contamination in the municipal drinking water supply. Maine has prohibited land application of biosolids, and other states, like Connecticut, have enacted similar laws.

    III. Compliance, Enforcement, and Litigation Risks

    As noted, PFAS-related liability risks for mining and metals companies may include both legacy contamination concerns (e.g., under CERCLA) and ongoing compliance requirements (e.g., CWA permitting, TRI reporting and waste management). Key regulatory frameworks are summarized below.

    CERCLA: Following the 2024 designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances—now upheld by the DC Circuit—facilities must report releases that meet or exceed one pound within a 24-hour period. Civil actions by governmental and private parties to address PFOA and PFOS contamination are becoming more common. In an April 2024 memo, EPA indicated it will focus enforcement on “significant contributors,” which may include mining and metals operations in some circumstances. EPA has begun investigating the possible presence of PFAS in mine site cleanups.

    EPCRA and TSCA: Over 200 PFAS are now TRI-reportable with a 100-pound threshold—significantly below standard TRI thresholds. EPA has designated PFAS as “chemicals of special concern,” so PFAS in low concentrations in mixtures and trade-name products must be counted toward thresholds. TRI reporting can apply to ancillary use of PFAS-containing products. Additionally, companies that have imported PFAS-containing equipment could face reporting obligations under Section 8(a)(7) of TSCA, although EPA has proposed a rule that would implement broad exemptions and reduce exposure for importers and products with only small amounts of PFAS.

    CWA: EPA has signaled it may pursue PFAS-related effluent limitation guidelines (including for metal finishing and electroplating wastewater discharges that may contain PFAS). State action is also likely, and PFAS-related permit terms are emerging. Citizen suits under the CWA have already targeted PFAS contamination from biosolids application, resulting in consent decrees requiring remedial actions (for example, this decree in CRBI v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:24-cv-68 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2024)).

    SDWA: Remote mine sites that operate water systems serving 25 or more people may be subject to SDWA requirements. Initial monitoring for PFOA and PFOS must be completed by April 2027, and compliance with the Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) of 4.0 ppt is required by 2029. EPA has proposed extending certain deadlines and rescinding some MCLs (for PFHxS, PFNA, HFPO-DA, and the hazard index), but the 2024 rule remains in effect.

    State laws and other exposure: Many states have enacted PFAS drinking water standards, restrictions on PFAS in products and packaging, biosolids application prohibitions, and state superfund or cleanup programs targeting PFAS contamination. Some states have also banned the manufacture, distribution, sale, and/or use of firefighting foams with intentionally added PFAS. Additionally, common-law toxic tort suits against potential sources of PFAS contamination have proliferated.

    IV. Next Steps

    Given the expanding web of PFAS regulations, mining and metals companies should identify and evaluate their PFAS-related liability risks, particularly related to PFOA and PFOS. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. However, mandatory reporting requirements (under CERCLA and potentially EPCRA and TSCA) and monitoring requirements (under the SDWA) make at least some level of compliance assessment prudent.

    Potential action items include the following:

    • Assess current and historical operations – Evaluate whether PFAS are currently used or were historically used in operations, such as in AFFF for firefighting, ore processing surfactants, fluoropolymer equipment components, and biosolids used for reclamation. Where feasible, explore opportunities to reduce or eliminate PFAS use through substitution or process changes.
    • Review insurance coverage – Review current policies for PFAS exclusions and assess whether legacy policies may cover claims arising now.
    • Preserve institutional knowledge – Identify employees, retirees, or contractors with knowledge of historical PFAS use and develop a plan to capture that information. This knowledge base can be critical to assessing liability and constructing a defensible factual record.
    • Establish compliance protocols – Develop internal protocols for evaluating PFAS in new materials, tracking regulatory updates, and ensuring adherence to current and future regulatory requirements.
    • Evaluate disclosure obligations – Public companies should assess whether PFAS-related exposure warrants disclosure in financial filings. All companies should consider how potential PFAS liabilities may affect lending relationships and project financing.
    • Address transactional considerations – PFAS considerations are increasingly relevant in property and asset transactions. Buyers and sellers should consult with environmental counsel on how best to evaluate and address PFAS in the transactional context. Companies may consider updating due diligence protocols, including Phase I environmental site assessment practices, to include PFAS-specific evaluations as warranted by the context.

    Davis Graham has extensive experience with the transactional, operational, and environmental questions and challenges facing mining and metals companies. For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of the Energy & Mining Group or Environmental & Public Lands Group.

    Caroline Schorsch

    October 27, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • Colorado Supreme Court Holds That an Umbrella/Excess Insurer Is Not Required to “Drop Down” and Provide First-Dollar Coverage When a Scheduled Primary Insurer Becomes Insolvent

    On September 21, 2026, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in A.R. Wilfley & Sons, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, 2026 CO 64, answering a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado concerning whether insolvency by the primary insurer shifts an otherwise covered occurrence in the “Not covered” category, thereby requiring the umbrella/excess carrier to step into the shoes of the insolvent insurer and provide first-dollar indemnity and defense costs. The Court answered that question no, determining instead that “Not covered,” as used in those policies, speaks to the scope of coverage, not collectability of payment.

    Background

    A.R. Wilfley & Sons, Inc. (“Wilfley”) has manufactured pumps for mining and industrial operations for over a century. Since the 1980s, Wilfley has faced a steady stream of lawsuits concerning asbestos exposure in its products (the “Underlying Actions”). Coverage for the Underlying Actions was largely supplied by two primary insurers—Great Northern Insurance Company (“Great Northern”) and Reliance Insurance Company (“Reliance”). But eventually, Great Northern’s policy limits were depleted, and Reliance became insolvent, leaving Wilfley without any functioning source of primary coverage.

    Back in the 1980s, Federal Insurance Company (“Federal”) issued at least three umbrella/excess policies (the “Federal Policies”) to Wilfley. The Federal Policies sat atop the coverage tower, above various underlying primary policies—including scheduled primary policies issued by Reliance. Under these policies, Federal was required to pay on behalf of Wilfley for covered occurrences but defend only with respect to any occurrence “not covered by the underlying policies listed in the schedule of underlying insurance, or any other underlying insurance collectible by the insured, but covered by the terms and conditions of this policy.”

    After all underlying primary insurance fell away, Wilfley tendered the Underlying Actions to Federal. Federal agreed to defend under a full reservation of rights but ultimately denied coverage. Wilfley then filed suit in federal court, alleging breach of contract, seeking declaratory relief, and pursuing a claim of common law insurance bad faith. Wilfley argued that because Reliance’s coverage had become uncollectible due to insolvency, the Underlying Actions were “not covered” by Reliance’s policies, and Federal was required to drop down and supply primary coverage.

    The district court initially ruled in Federal’s favor, concluding that the Federal Policies did not require Federal to step into the shoes of an insolvent primary insurer. The district court later withdrew its order and certified the dispositive question to the Colorado Supreme Court, noting both the absence of controlling precedent and the potential tension with the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision in Deisch & Marion, P.C. v. International Insurance Co., 771 P.2d 19 (Colo. App. 1989).

    The Court’s Analysis

    As noted above, the Court answered the certified question no, holding that the phrase “not covered” in the Federal Policies addresses the scope of coverage—not the collectability of payment for a covered occurrence. Three provisions in the Federal Policies, as found by the Court, confirmed this distinction between “covered” (addressing whether an occurrence falls within the scope of a scheduled underlying policy) and “collectible” (addressing whether insurance is available from an unscheduled insurer):

    1. Defense Provisions: Federal’s duty to defend was limited to occurrences “not covered by the underlying policies listed in the schedule of underlying insurance, or any other underlying insurance collectible by the insured.” The use of “covered” for scheduled policies and “collectible” for unscheduled policies demonstrated a deliberate distinction.
    2. Underlying Limit Provision: The insured’s underlying limit was defined as “an amount equal to the limits of liability indicated beside the underlying insurance listed in the schedule of underlying insurance, plus the applicable limits of any other underlying insurance collectible by the insured.” Again, collectability applied only to unscheduled insurance.
    3. Other Insurance Condition: Federal’s indemnification obligations were in excess of all “other valid and collectible insurance with any other insurer . . . available to the insured.” Collectability was tied exclusively to insurance from unscheduled carriers.

    The Court reasoned that if “covered” and “collectible” were synonymous—as Wilfley urged—the distinction between scheduled and unscheduled insurers would be erased. The Court further noted that the “Maintenance of Underlying Insurance” condition required Wilfley to maintain its scheduled underlying insurance in full effect, underscoring a deliberate allocation of risk: Wilfley selected and was responsible for maintaining solvent primary carriers, whereas Federal did not bargain to be a financial guarantor of those carriers.

    The Court found further support in federal and state decisions from other jurisdictions, including the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co., 293 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2002), which rejected an identical argument under Colorado law and held that “not covered” plainly referred to “an event which does not meet the definition of a covered event in the underlying policies.”

    Finally, the Court addressed the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision in Deisch & Marion, P.C. v. International Insurance Co., 771 P.2d 19 (Colo. App. 1989), on which Wilfley relied upon heavily. The court distinguished Deisch on multiple grounds: Deisch involved a different type of claimant (the insured’s defense counsel, not the insured itself), arose in a different procedural posture, and was resolved on an equitable implied-contract theory—not on contractual interpretation of the umbrella/excess policy. The Court concluded that the division’s brief discussion of the policy language was dictum and, to the extent Deisch is incompatible with this opinion, expressly overruled it.

    Implications

    This decision resolves an open question of Colorado law and provides guidance on the interplay between umbrella/excess policies and the insolvency of scheduled primary insurers. The Court’s holding aligns Colorado with the majority of federal and state courts that have addressed this issue, confirming that the phrase “not covered” in an umbrella/excess policy speaks to the scope of coverage under the underlying policy—not the financial ability of the underlying insurer to pay.

    Because umbrella/excess carriers are not obligated to drop down in the event of a scheduled primary insurer’s insolvency, policyholders may bear the risk of maintaining solvent primary carriers and may need to explore other avenues—such as state guaranty funds or direct pursuit of insolvent carriers’ receivership estates—to fill the gap left by an insolvent primary insurer.

     The decision also suggests that reliance on Deisch as authority for requiring umbrella/excess carriers to assume defense obligations when a primary insurer becomes insolvent is no longer permissible.


    For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of the Davis Graham Appellate Group.

    Caroline Schorsch

    October 23, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • Colorado Court of Appeals Holds that Overriding Royalty Interests Derived From Nonconsenting Owners’ Working Interests Are Not Payable Until Consenting Working Interest Owners Recover Costs and Penalties Under the Pooling Statute 

    On July 23, 2026, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Myrick v. Colorado Energy & Carbon Management Commission, 2026 COA 61, addressing a matter of first impression in Colorado oil and gas law: whether overriding royalty interests (ORRIs) derived from nonconsenting working interests in and to a well must be paid immediately upon production of such well, or only after consenting working interest owners have recovered the nonconsenting owners’ share of the costs of drilling, completing, equipping, and operating such well plus statutory penalties detailed in C.R.S. § 34-60-116(7)(b) (the “Pooling Statute”), also known as when a well reaches “Payout”. In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Freyre, the division held that ORRIs derived from a nonconsenting working interest owner’s share are not payable until consenting working interest owners have recovered the costs and penalties detailed in the Pooling Statute. 

    Background 

    Several foundational concepts in oil and gas law are necessary to understand the division’s decision. 

    In Colorado, operators of oil and gas wells can seek to combine, or pool, mineral interests underlying multiple tracts into a single drilling and spacing unit (DSU) so that one well (or a set of wells) can produce collectively from the pooled lands.  That pooled DSU may contain lands covered by multiple different leases, which may in turn grant working interests, which include the rights to develop minerals, to multiple different parties. One way to accomplish such pooling is to request that a pooling order be issued by the Colorado Energy & Carbon Management Commission (“ECMC”).  That pooling order designates an operator (generally the party with the highest percentage of working interest in the DSU).  

    When an operator proposes the drilling of a new well in a DSU, it must send out election letters to any other parties who own a working interest in the lands included within the DSU.  The other working interest owners must then decide whether or not they wish to participate in the well.  If a working interest owner participates, or consents, then they are required to bear their share of the costs of drilling, completing, equipping, and operating such well, and are entitled to receive their share of the production from such well.  If a working interest owner does not participate, or nonconsents, then they are not required to bear their share of the costs of drilling, completing, equipping, and operating such well until Payout, but they may not receive their share of the production until Payout. 

    The question addressed by the court in Myrick is whether these cost recovery provisions apply not only to working interest owners, but also to owners of ORRIs.   

    An ORRI is a right to payment from production carved out of the working interest granted in an oil and gas lease.  ORRIs are generally non-cost bearing, meaning they entitle the holder to a portion of production revenue without regard to the costs incurred to generate that production.  In Myrick, the court considered whether a holder of an ORRI carved out of nonconsenting working interest should be subject to the cost recovery provisions imposed on nonconsenting working interests since the ORRI is derivative of that nonconsenting interest, or whether the ORRI is immune from the cost recovery provision since the interest is non-cost bearing.  As detailed below, the court found that the derivative nature of the interest was dispositive and that holders of an ORRI are subject to the same cost recovery provisions as the working interest owners from which that particular ORRI is derived.  

    The ECMC and District Court Orders 

    The Myricks owned a 1.25% ORRI in oil and gas leases within the Sonic Star Drilling and Spacing Unit, a 1,920-acre DSU in Weld County operated by Verdad Resources LLC. For seven of Verdad’s eight wells in the DSU, Verdad was the sole consenting working interest owner, and three other working interest owners declined to participate; on the other well, two working interest owners joined Verdad as consenting owners. In 2022, Verdad sent division orders to the Myricks reflecting that no ORRI revenue would be paid from the nonconsenting working interest owners’ interests until those interests reached Payout. The Myricks challenged this before the ECMC, which ruled in Verdad’s favor. On appeal, the district court affirmed, and the Myricks appealed again to the Colorado Court of Appeals. 

    Colorado Law 

    The primary statutory provision at issue is section 34-60-116(7), which governs the rights and obligations of consenting and nonconsenting working interest owners under forced pooling orders. 

    Subsection (7)(a)(I) requires pooling orders to provide for reimbursement to consenting working interest owners from the nonconsenting working interest owners’ share of production, “excluding royalty or other interest not obligated to pay any part of the cost thereof,” provided the royalty is “consistent with the lease terms prevailing in the area and is not designed to avoid the recovery of costs.” Subsection (7)(a)(II) provides that nonconsenting working interest owners are not entitled to receive their share of production until “the consenting owners have recovered the nonconsenting owner’s share of the costs out of production.” Subsection (7)(b) establishes a penalty structure: consenting owners may recover 100% of the nonconsenting owners’ share of surface equipment and operation costs, and 200% of certain other costs—including drilling, completion, and testing—as a statutory penalty for nonconsent. 

    In 2017, the ECMC issued Order No. 1-202 (the “Catamount Order”), which addressed the same ORRI payment issue. In that order, the ECMC concluded that ORRIs are not among the interests to be paid during the cost recovery period because they are carved from the interests of nonconsenting working interest owners who are obligated to reimburse consenting working interest owners. The ECMC also noted that the legislature specifically names ORRIs in other sections of the statute but chose not to include them in the “excluding” language of subsection (7)(a)(I). Order No. 1-202 was not appealed. 

    In 2018, after the ECMC issued Order No. 1-202, the General Assembly amended section 34-60-116(7)(a)(I). Notably, the legislature did not add “overriding royalties” to the list of interests excluded from the cost recovery scheme. Instead, it added qualifying language requiring that any excluded royalty be “consistent with the lease terms prevailing in the area” and “not designed to avoid the recovery of costs.” This legislative silence regarding ORRIs is significant to the division’s statutory interpretation. 

    The Division’s Opinion 

    In this case, a division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the ECMC’s order and the district court’s judgment, holding that the Pooling Statute unambiguously provides that ORRIs derived from nonconsenting owners’ working interests are subject to the cost recovery scheme and are not payable until the consenting working interest owners reach payout. 

    The division began by finding that the Pooling Statute is unambiguous. The central interpretive question was whether the phrase “or other interest not obligated to pay any part of the cost thereof” in section 34-60-116(7)(a)(I) encompasses ORRIs derived from nonconsenting working interest owners’ interests. The division concluded it does not. 

    The division’s reasoning centered on the derivative nature of an ORRI. While ORRIs are themselves non-cost bearing, they are carved from a working interest—an interest obligated to pay costs. The division cited Grynberg v. Waltman, 946 P.2d 473, 476 (Colo. App. 1997), for the foundational principle that an ORRI “cannot be greater than the interest from which it is derived.” Because a nonconsenting owner’s working interest is subject to the statutory cost recovery scheme, an ORRI carved from that interest is subject to that same scheme. 

    The division held the phrase “other interest[s] not obligated to pay any part of the cost” captures “interests granted or reserved from the landowners’ interest” such as an interest created from the landowners’ “fee simple before executing a lease or from its share of the royalty after executing the lease.” Myrick v. Colo. Energy, 2026 COA 61, ¶ 29. This reading harmonizes with the statutory structure and purpose: the exclusion protects landowner-created interests that are fundamentally separate from the cost-bearing working interest, not lessee-created burdens on that working interest. 

    The division found significant the legislature’s failure to add “overriding royalties” to the exclusion in section 34-60-116(7)(a)(I) after the Catamount Order. The legislature amended this very provision in 2018—after the Catamount Order was issued—and yet did not add ORRIs to the protected interests, despite naming ORRIs explicitly in other parts of the statute. The division treated this as a signal of legislative approval of the ECMC’s interpretation. 

    Finally, the division noted that allowing private contracts creating ORRIs to trump the statutory cost recovery scheme would subvert the rights of consenting working interest owners who are not parties to those contracts. Permitting ORRI holders to extract payments from the nonconsenting working interest owners’ share of production before payout would undermine the incentive structure the Pooling Statute creates. 

    Key Takeaways 

    The Myrick decision provides important clarity on a question that has significant practical consequences for oil and gas operations in Colorado. For the first time, an appellate court has confirmed the ECMC’s interpretation that ORRIs derived from nonconsenting owners’ working interests are subject to the Pooling Statute’s cost recovery scheme and are not payable until after the consenting working interest owners reach Payout. 


    For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of the Davis Graham Appellate Group.

    Caroline Schorsch

    September 18, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • In Major PFAS “Forever Chemicals” Decision, D.C. Circuit Upholds EPA’s Designation of PFOS and PFOA as Hazardous Substances under CERCLA

    On August 18, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued its decision in Chamber of Commerce, et al. v. EPA, No. 24-1193, denying industry petitions to overturn EPA’s 2024 designation of perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) as hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). PFOS and PFOA are two prevalent per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), synthetic compounds known colloquially as “forever chemicals” because their chemical composition is highly resistant to breaking down in the environment. The rule designating the compounds as hazardous substances has been effective since July 2024, but the D.C. Circuit’s landmark ruling confirms EPA’s broad statutory authority to expand the universe of CERCLA hazardous substances, cements PFAS as a significant potential liability, and promises to increase scrutiny on entities that have used PFAS in their operations, own legacy operations involving PFAS, or engage in transactions involving legacy use and impacts.

    CERCLA in Brief

    CERCLA, commonly known as the “Superfund” law, imposes liability on parties responsible for the presence of hazardous substances at a contaminated site. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675). There are four categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs): (1) current owners and operators of a contaminated facility; (2) past owners and operators at the time hazardous substances were disposed of; (3) generators and persons who arranged for the disposal or transport of hazardous substances; and (4) transporters of hazardous substances that selected the disposal site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). CERCLA liability is strict, joint and several, and retroactive, and defenses to liability are narrow and difficult to establish.

    The designation of PFOS and PFOA as “hazardous substances” under the statute has several key implications. The rule further empowered EPA enforcement actions to force cleanups at contaminated sites. It also confirmed that parties—including government or private entities—who perform response actions to clean up PFOS and PFOA can seek cost recovery from PRPs. From an ongoing compliance perspective, the rule also required reporting for releases of PFOA or PFOS that exceed one pound. It created additional environmental due diligence implications on the front end of property transactions. And finally, the D.C. Circuit decision closes the door, absent U.S. Supreme Court review, on skepticism that the PFOS and PFOA designation would be rolled back by the courts.

    The D.C. Circuit’s Core Holding: Confirming EPA’s CERCLA Section 102(a) Authority

    Although the Petitioners raised several issues, the central question before the court in Chamber of Commerce was whether EPA had statutory authority under CERCLA section 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a), to designate PFOS and PFOA as hazardous substances. That statutory section authorizes EPA to promulgate regulations that designate “elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment” as hazardous substances under CERCLA. EPA used that authority to promulgate just such a rule in 2024. The 2024 rulemaking represented a novel regulatory approach because it was the first time EPA had exercised its standalone Section 102(a) designation authority in the more than four decades since CERCLA’s enactment.

    Petitioners, led by the Chamber of Commerce and several industry trade groups, argued that EPA had to demonstrate that substantial danger will occur upon a release to the environment of PFOS or PFOA, not merely that it may occur. The court rejected that argument, holding that “may” carries its ordinary meaning of possibility and contingency, and that Congress deliberately chose probabilistic language suited to a regulatory framework built on evolving scientific evidence. The court also held that the “substantial danger” qualifier provides meaningful limits in that the risk must be “serious and real, not hypothesized,” but that PFOS and PFOA clearly satisfy that standard given the volume of peer-reviewed research linking them to serious health harms.

    The bottom line is unambiguous: EPA’s designation of PFOS and PFOA as hazardous substances under CERCLA stands. The court also paved the way for future exercise of EPA’s Section 102(a) authority to add other emerging contaminants (including other PFAS compounds) to the list of CERCLA hazardous substances.

    High-Risk Sectors: When to Pay Attention

    Under the now-confirmed rule, PFOS and PFOA must be approached with the same gravity and care as other conventional legacy contamination issues. There is no one-size-fits-all approach and a broad cross-section of industries are potentially impacted by the regulatory listing.

    Real estate and commercial lending professionals across all sectors should understand and adapt standard protocols for evaluating PFAS because the hazardous substance designation may change the environmental risk profile of commercial and industrial properties and could require updated environmental site assessments.

    Parties to real estate and corporate transactions should consult with knowledgeable environmental counsel on how best to evaluate and address PFOS and PFOA in the transactional context. Potential considerations include:

    • Due diligence: Updating due diligence protocols, including Phase I environmental site assessment practices, to include PFAS-specific evaluations as warranted by the context
    • Contracting: Addressing PFAS liability through various means including indemnification provisions, environmental representations and warranties, and purchase price adjustment mechanisms
    • Insurance: Evaluating existing and available insurance coverage to address historical liabilities and protect against potential future claims

    Releases of PFOS or PFOA may trigger regulatory obligations with federal, state, and local implications.

    Parties should proceed carefully to evaluate whether or how to elevate potential liabilities associated with the broader set of PFAS, but especially PFOS and PFOA. Because PFAS are ubiquitous in the environment from decades of use and intentional or inadvertent disposal, if you go looking for them, you may just find them—and not every context will warrant, for example, intrusive sampling such as in a Phase II environmental site assessment.

    While the list of impacted sites and potential contributors of PFAS in the environment is ever-growing, the following sectors and business contexts may carry elevated risk and may therefore warrant heightened attention:

    • Properties near airports, military bases, and fire training facilities where aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) has historically been used in firefighting and emergency response training
    • Companies that have manufactured, used, or stored AFFF, including industrial facilities, petroleum terminals, and chemical plants
    • Wastewater treatment facilities and landfills that have received PFAS-laden influent or accepted PFAS-containing waste streams (EPA did acknowledge in the rulemaking process that existing liability limitations, including protections for de minimis and de micromis contributors, may temper exposure for passive receivers)
    • Mining operations utilizing PFAS-based surfactants
    • Winter sporting facilities where PFAS compounds may be present through wax, fabric treatments, and onsite AFFF systems
    • Properties where AFFF has been used for conventional firefighting
    • Car washes
    • Land application of biosolids
    • Building fire suppression systems containing AFFF

    The Patchwork of State PFAS Restrictions

    The D.C. Circuit’s decision upholding the PFOS and PFOA CERCLA designation does not exist in a vacuum. A growing number of states have enacted their own bans or restrictions on PFAS in consumer products, firefighting foam, and industrial applications. Colorado, for example, has prohibited the sale of products containing intentionally added PFAS across a wide range of categories, including food packaging, carpets, cosmetics, cookware, ski wax, and textile furnishings, with additional product categories phasing in through 2028. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-15-601 to -606. Maine’s near-total ban on intentionally added PFAS in consumer products takes effect January 1, 2030. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 1614. Minnesota’s “Amara’s Law” extends to all products by January 1, 2032, unless the use is deemed “currently unavoidable.” Minn. Stat. § 116.943. Several other states have adopted or are considering similar restrictions, and most states have banned or restricted PFAS-containing Class B firefighting foam.

    However, there is no uniform federal ban on PFAS in products, and many states have no restrictions at all. The result is a patchwork in which PFAS-containing products remain widely available in commerce even as the CERCLA designation imposes potential cleanup liability for the most prevalent of those substances. The gap between permissible product use and environmental liability exposure is narrowing.

    Looking Ahead

    Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, there will be an increase in EPA enforcement and private cost-recovery actions related to PFOS and PFOA. Companies across affected sectors should not wait for site-specific enforcement or other legal action to begin evaluating potential exposure. Proactive steps, including environmental audits, contractual protections in transactions, and insurance coverage review may be advisable to help manage evolving PFAS liabilities.

    Parties should contact experienced environmental legal advisors and consultants knowledgeable about PFAS to determine the proper path for addressing sites that are suspected of potential contamination. Anyone with questions about how this new ruling affects their operations or pending transactions is welcome to contact the authors.

    Caroline Schorsch

    August 21, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • Colorado Supreme Court Holds That Courts Have Discretion to Allow Pre-Immediate Possession Hearing Discovery in Condemnation Proceedings

    Theresa Wardon Benz, Molly Kokesh, Makenna Johnson, Logan Venclauskas

    On June 23, 2026, in In re Arrowhead Colorado Metropolitan District v. Roxborough Park Foundation, 2026 CO 54, the Colorado Supreme Court held that trial courts have discretion to order discovery before immediate possession hearings in eminent domain proceedings.

    Background

    Eminent domain proceedings generally require resolution of three questions:

    • whether the condemnor has the right to take the property;
    • how much just compensation the condemnor must pay for the taking; and
    • if necessary, how to apportion the just compensation award among those who own interests in the property being condemned.

    When a condemnor requests immediate possession, the court must resolve all issues bearing on the right to condemn before granting that request—requiring a full evidentiary hearing early in the case, much like a proceeding on a preliminary injunction.

    In In re Arrowhead Colorado Metropolitan District v. Roxborough Park Foundation, Arrowhead Colorado Metropolitan District (“Arrowhead”), a quasi-municipal corporation and political subdivision, filed a petition to condemn easements over private roads owned by the Roxborough Park Foundation (the “Foundation”) in Roxborough Park, Douglas County. Upon filing the Petition, Arrowhead moved to set a hearing on its request for immediate possession under section 38-1-105(6)(a), C.R.S., and the trial court set the hearing as required by statute and Colorado case law.

    With an immediate possession hearing set, the Foundation moved for limited, expedited discovery, arguing it was necessary to prepare for issues it planned to raise at the hearing. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that neither Colorado’s eminent domain statutes (sections 38-1-101 to -122, C.R.S.) nor the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure permitted such discovery. The trial court reasoned that the Rules allow discovery only after entry of a case management order, which itself requires the case to be “at issue” under C.R.C.P. 16(b)(1). Because condemnation proceedings do not require responsive pleadings, the court concluded such cases can never be “at issue,” making discovery categorically unavailable. The Foundation sought relief under C.A.R. 21, and the Colorado Supreme Court granted the petition.

    The Court’s Analysis

    In its decision, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that the condemnation statutes (sections 38-1-101 to -122, C.R.S.) are silent on discovery but held that this silence does not eliminate discovery rights. Citing section 38-1-121(3), C.R.S., which expressly preserves “the discovery rights of parties to eminent domain proceedings,” the Court found that the legislature intended to maintain those rights. Because the statutes are silent on procedure, however, the Court then turned to the Rules of Civil Procedure.

    The Court identified three provisions in Colorado’s Rules that authorize trial courts to order discovery, when appropriate, even if a case is not “at issue.”

    First, the Court noted that Rule 26(d)’s statement that “a party may not seek discovery from any source before [] service of the Case Management Order pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16(b)” is preceded by the qualifier “[e]xcept when authorized by these Rules, by order, or by agreement of the parties.” Under this plain language, the Court held that a trial court may allow discovery before a case management order is served—and that the trial court here could have authorized discovery on that basis alone.

    Second, the Court held that trial courts’ discretion under Rule 26(b)(2) to limit discovery for “good cause shown,” based on the factors in C.R.C.P. 26(b)(2)(F), also allows a court to permit discovery before an immediate possession hearing in a condemnation proceeding where good cause exists.

    Third, the Court determined that Rule 16(b)(1) establishes two alternative paths for deeming a case “at issue”: (1) when all parties have been served and all required pleadings have been filed, or (2) “at such other time as the court may direct.” The Court reasoned that the second path allows trial courts to order prehearing discovery in condemnation proceedings by deeming the case “at issue” despite the absence of responsive pleadings.

    Practical Implications

    Arrowhead clarifies that although condemnation cases are strict statutory proceedings, trial courts retain flexibility to apply the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure to discovery requests just as they would in any other civil proceeding. Specifically, upon a showing of good cause, either party may ask the court for leave to conduct discovery that may not otherwise be automatic.

    Because courts may grant possession as early as thirty days after service of a condemnation petition, a party who believes there is good cause for expedited discovery ahead of an immediate possession hearing should seek leave from the court to conduct such discovery early in the proceedings.

    The Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion on the discovery motion.

    The unanimous opinion was authored by Justice Blanco.


    For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of the Davis Graham Appellate Group.

    Caroline Schorsch

    August 17, 2026
    Legal Alerts
  • ACHP Draft Rule Would Rewrite the Playbook for NHPA Section 106 Review: What the Leaked Draft Says & What Comes Next

    On July 24, 2026, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (“ACHP”) voted to advance a draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) that would make sweeping amendments to its regulations implementing Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”). If finalized, they would be the most significant rewrite of the Section 106 process since ACHP’s last major revisions in 2000. Framed as implementing Executive Order 14192’s deregulatory mandate and responding to Section 106 reviews that can stretch nearly seven years, the proposal touches nearly every stage of the process: what counts as a historic property, what effects agencies must weigh, who has a seat at the table, and how fast a project can move.

    The draft NPRM has not yet been published in the Federal Register. It must first undergo review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) within the White House Office of Management and Budget. OIRA review and Federal Register publication could occur as early as August or September 2026, with the 30-day comment period closing roughly 30 days thereafter. Given the scope of the changes and ACHP’s explicit invitation for data-driven feedback, project proponents would benefit by beginning to prepare comments now so they are ready to submit as soon as the comment window opens.

    Background: The Leaked Draft & How We Got Here

    The path to the July 24 vote was unusually compressed—and controversial. In January 2026, ACHP Vice Chairman Travis Voyles announced an intent to revisit the Section 106 regulations, emphasizing collaboration with Council members and the broader preservation community. In February 2026, ACHP established a working group and invited member participation. On June 4, 2026, the full Council adopted a resolution directing staff to develop a regulatory timeline within 30 days and providing members 60 days to submit additional comments before any proposed rule was formulated.

    That timeline never materialized. Instead, on July 17, 2026, Vice Chairman Voyles circulated a nearly complete draft rewrite of 36 C.F.R. part 800 to Council members and called for an unassembled (email) vote within one week—bypassing the previously outlined deliberative process. Although the draft was stamped “Not Public,” it leaked almost immediately and was widely shared on social media and among preservation and industry stakeholders. Several Council members and organizations—including the National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers and the National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers—voted no or publicly objected to the truncated process, arguing that Tribal Nations and other stakeholders were denied a meaningful opportunity to review changes of this magnitude. Nonetheless, on July 24 the draft NPRM was approved by a vote of 16 in favor, 5 opposed, and 2 abstentions.

    The draft NPRM has now proceeded to OIRA for interagency review, a required step before Federal Register publication. ACHP has not published a confirmed schedule for any step after OIRA review. On an accelerated timeline, project Federal Register publication could occur in August 2026, with the 30-day comment period closing in September 2026, a final rule potentially published by late 2026 or early 2027, and the rule taking effect 30 days after that. Under a more standard timeline, a final, effective rule would more realistically be expected in mid-to-late 2027 or later. Legal challenges after a final rule is published could further extend the period before the rule is settled.

    The following summarizes the key substantive changes in the leaked draft. Given the scope of the changes and ACHP’s explicit invitation for data-driven feedback, the leaked NPRM presents a real opportunity for project proponents to shape the final rule—not just react to it. Because the public comment window may be short and open on relatively brief notice, proponents can use the time before publication to prepare. Importantly, however, because the draft NPRM could be revised during OIRA review, the draft described below should not be assumed to reflect the published version if and when it is released.

    1. Narrower Definitions Shrink What Counts as a “Historic Property” or an “Effect”

      The draft NPRM would sharply narrow the effects agencies must consider. Most notably, it would revise the criteria for “adverse effect” by removing references to indirect and cumulative effects, instead limiting “adverse effects” to “only those reasonably foreseeable effects that have a reasonably close causal relationship to the undertaking.” These potential modifications track recent changes to federal environmental reviews that stem from the Supreme Court’s decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, 605 U.S. 168 (2025) and corresponding changes to National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) guidance.

      The draft would also delete two current examples of adverse effects: “[c]hange of the character of the property’s use or of physical features within the property’s setting that contribute to its historic significance,” and “[i]ntroduction of visual, atmospheric or audible elements that diminish the integrity of the property’s significant historic features.” In parallel, the draft NPRM would narrow the definition of “area of potential effects” to encompass only direct effects. Those potential deletions would walk back a 2019 ACHP memo that clarified that direct effects could also include visual, auditory, or atmospheric impacts.

      The proposed definition of “historic property” would also be narrower. It would require a property, including a Tribal historic property, to include or have included tangible human improvements, or to have been the location of specific human activities, and to be geographically compact. Read literally, that could exclude the broad traditional cultural properties (“TCPs”), sacred landscapes, mountains, and rivers that many Tribes rely on Section 106 to protect.

    2. The Agency Official Gets the Pen, Public & Tribal Participation Become Discretionary, and Applicants Become Consulting Parties

      The draft NPRM would strip out most of the regulatory detail on Tribal consultation, leaving the agency’s underlying statutory duty intact but far less defined in the text agencies actually follow day to day. Specifically, Tribal Historic Preservation Officers (“THPOs”) and State Historic Preservation Officers (“SHPOs”) would no longer play a role in identifying historic properties, assessing impacts, and recommending avoidance or mitigation measures as an initial matter. Instead, the agency official would prepare a “Section 106 report” that identifies historic properties, assesses impacts, and makes a determination on next steps. This Section 106 report would then be circulated to SHPOs, THPOs, and all relevant consulting parties—including project proponents—who would have an opportunity to comment on the findings. The agency official must review those comments but has no obligation to respond to or incorporate any before issuing the final memorandum of decision (“MOD”). That MOD would largely replace today’s negotiated “memorandum of agreement” (“MOA”) process, shifting Section 106 from a consensus-seeking exercise to one where the agency official simply decides. Notably, in the draft NPRM, the ACHP proposes to ask the public whether the MOA process should survive as an alternative path—a question that may prompt significant public response.

      Similarly, public comment would shift from mandatory to optional, on the theory that Section 106 itself only guarantees comment rights to the ACHP, not the public at large. That said, ACHP would ask potential commenters whether public participation may still be useful where it can surface community concerns early and reduce litigation risk.

      And finally, applicants for federal funding or permits subject to Section 106 consultation would now be invited to become consulting parties.

    3. More Off-Ramps, Exemptions & NEPA Alignment

      The proposal would also borrow from the NEPA playbook. It would encourage procedures that function like NEPA categorical exclusions, create clearer on- and off-ramps for Section 106 review, and provide an expedited path where no historic properties are present. The draft would also narrow the definition of “undertaking” to exclude state, Tribal, and local permits issued under delegated federal authority—potentially removing a meaningful category of projects from Section 106 review entirely. Program alternatives are narrowed as well, dropping underused options (like “standard treatments”) while streamlining the ones that remain.

    4. Other Notable Changes
      • Economic impacts and cost considerations would be added to the calculus for avoidance, minimization, and mitigation measures.
      • A new “address adverse effects” definition would introduce a term of art for avoidance, minimization, and mitigation measures.

    5. ACHP May Ask Pointed Questions – Worth Answering

      Beyond the standard request for comment, ACHP would pose specific questions that signal where the rule could still move: whether the MOA process should remain available alongside the new MOD; whether public comment should stay optional or be restored as a requirement; whether more (not less) Tribal consultation detail belongs in the regulatory text; and—notably—for data and statistics quantifying how the current process delays projects. Proponents with real timeline and cost data have a genuine chance to influence the final rule on this last point.

    6. Bottom Line for Energy and Mining Projects

      If finalized, the draft NPRM would affect projects on federal public lands, projects receiving federal funding such as Department of Energy grants, and projects requiring federal permits such as Army Corps of Engineers Section 404 permits. The upside for project proponents is real: narrower definitions, expanded exemptions, and a decision-maker no longer bound to negotiate an MOA could mean faster, more predictable reviews.

      The trade-off is added litigation risk. Narrower “historic property” and “effect” definitions, along with discretionary Tribal and public consultation, may draw legal challenges from Tribes and environmental groups once a final rule is published or as applied to individual projects. Several organizations have already issued statements and advocacy alerts, signaling that they are monitoring developments closely and may be considering legal challenges. A strong administrative record—and continued voluntary engagement with affected Tribes regardless of what the regulations require—remains the best hedge against that risk. Additionally, the draft NPRM indicates that ACHP may request project-level data from commenters, and while the formal 30-day comment window has not started to run, that window will move fast once it does. Accordingly, project proponents should start developing their comments and supporting timeline and cost data now, so they are ready to submit as soon as the draft NPRM is published.

    For questions about this legal alert, please contact a member of Davis Graham’s Energy & Mining Group.

    Lindsey Reifsnider

    August 16, 2026
    Legal Alerts
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